Love Your Fellow As You Love Yourself - The Role of Jews As Citizens In the Abortion Debate
Parashat Kedoshim 2022/5782
Leviticus 10:16 - 18
לֹא־תֵלֵךְ רָכִיל בְּעַמֶּיךָ לֹא תַעֲמֹד עַל־דַּם רֵעֶךָ אֲנִי יְי׃
Do not deal basely with your countrymen. Do not profit by the blood of your fellow: I am the LORD.
לֹא־תִשְׂנָא אֶת־אָחִיךָ בִּלְבָבֶךָ הוֹכֵחַ תּוֹכִיחַ אֶת־עֲמִיתֶךָ וְלֹא־תִשָּׂא עָלָיו חֵטְא׃
You shall not hate your kinsfolk in your heart. Reprove your kinsman but incur no guilt because of him.
לֹא־תִקֹּם וְלֹא־תִטֹּר אֶת־בְּנֵי עַמֶּךָ וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ אֲנִי יְי׃
You shall not take vengeance or bear a grudge against your countrymen. Love your fellow as yourself: I am the LORD.
JPS Commentary - Baruch A. Levine
16. Do not deal basely with your countrymen- Rather, "Do not act as a merchant toward your own kinsmen." This dictum remains ambiguous. Hebrew rakhil has usually been related to rokhel, “merchant.» The idiom lo' telekh rakhil has been interpreted to mean that one should not move about in the manner of a merchant, who is presumed to be privy to secret dealings and gossip. This is how the sense of talebearing developed in post-biblical Hebrew. In Jeremiah 6:28 and Ezekiel 22:9, rakhil is equated with acts of corruption and betrayal, even with murder.16 As a consequence, many traditional commentators, among them In Ezra, Ramban, Rashbam, and Rashi, relate the verbal root r-kh-l to r-g-l, "to spy." The Sifra preserves the following interpretation: "That you not act as a merchant who merely loads up his horse and departs.” Now, Hebrew be-'ammekha means "among, with your kinsmen." Perhaps the sense is that in dealing with one's own kinsmen one should not be "all business," interested solely in profit, but, rather, considerate and friendly. Merchants were often foreigners who felt no close ties to those with whom they did business. The passage, nevertheless, remains problematic.
Do not profit by the blood of your fellow- This part of the verse is also difficult to interpret because of the problems in ascertaining the sense of the Hebrew idiom lo' ta amod al, literally “do not stand over, by, near." There have been three principal suggestions. The first, "to stand aside, to stand by," has the sense that one ought not to stand by inactively when one's neighbor's life is in danger. This is the interpretation of the Sifra, followed by Rashi and others. Targum Yerushalmi understands this statement in a similar way: "Do not be silent concerning the blood' of your comrade when you know the truth in a legal case." The second suggestion takes the Hebrew to mean "to conspire against, act against." Thus, Targum Onkelos reads: «Do not rise up against the life of your comrade" (Aram. la tehum al dama' de-havrakh). This is similar to the interpretation of Ibn Ezra: "One ought not to join forces with murderers.» "To stand over" has this sense in several biblical passages. The third explanation of the Hebrew is "to survive by means of, subsist, rely on." Ehrlich compares Ezekiel 33:26: 'amadta 'al harbekha, «You have relied upon your sword for survival,» with Genesis 27:40: “al barbekha tibych, "Yet by your sword shall you live. "18 This last interpretation is the one expressed in the translation, and it best fits the immediate context. One ought not pursue one's own livelihood in a manner that endangers another or at the expense of another's well-being.
17. You shall not hate your kinsfolk in your heart- Verses 17-18 constitute a unit. The context suggests the interpretation that an individual should not allow ill feelings to fester; rather, he should confront his kinsman and admonish him directly, in this way avoiding grudges and vengeance that breed hatred. Moreover, a proper attitude promotes love for one's neighbor. The opening statement (v. 17) contrasts with the conclusion (v. I8) as hate contrasts with love. Reprove your kinsman but incur no guilt because of him Rather, "Reprove your neighbor so that you will not incur guilt on his account." As the sages put it: «Woe unto the wicked person, and woe unto his neighbor!" One may eventually suffer by being closely involved with wrongdoers, and it becomes necessary to protect oneself when close associates go astray. There is also the suggestion that, beyond self-interest, civic responsibility requires a person to admonish others out of concern for others and for the community as a whole.
Babylonian Talmud Shabbat 31a
שׁוּב מַעֲשֶׂה בְּגוֹי אֶחָד שֶׁבָּא לִפְנֵי שַׁמַּאי. אָמַר לוֹ: גַּיְּירֵנִי עַל מְנָת שֶׁתְּלַמְּדֵנִי כׇּל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ כְּשֶׁאֲנִי עוֹמֵד עַל רֶגֶל אַחַת! דְּחָפוֹ בְּאַמַּת הַבִּנְיָן שֶׁבְּיָדוֹ. בָּא לִפְנֵי הִלֵּל, גַּיְירֵיהּ. אָמַר לוֹ: דַּעֲלָךְ סְנֵי לְחַבְרָךְ לָא תַּעֲבֵיד — זוֹ הִיא כׇּל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ, וְאִידַּךְ פֵּירוּשַׁהּ הוּא, זִיל גְּמוֹר.
There was another incident involving one gentile who came before Shammai and said to Shammai: Convert me on condition that you teach me the entire Torah while I am standing on one foot. Shammai pushed him away with the builder’s cubit in his hand. This was a common measuring stick and Shammai was a builder by trade. The same gentile came before Hillel. He converted him and said to him: That which is hateful to you do not do to another; that is the entire Torah, and the rest is its interpretation. Go study.
The Ethics of Our Fathers 1:14
He [Rabbi Hillel] used to say: 1) If I am not for myself, who will be for me? 2) And if I am only for myself, what am I? 3) And if not now, when? | משנה אבות א׳:י״ד (יד) הוּא הָיָה אוֹמֵר אִם אֵין אֲנִי לִי, מִי לִי. וּכְשֶׁאֲנִי לְעַצְמִי, מָה אֲנִי. וְאִם לֹא עַכְשָׁיו, אֵימָתַי: |
“What Jewish law really says about abortion” - op-ed in JTA
“In Georgia and Alabama, even if a Jewish woman’s obstetrician and psychiatrist encouraged her to terminate a pregnancy due to her psychiatric state or the health status of the fetus, and even if her rabbi told her that Jewish law fully allows her to terminate, she would be forced by law to carry the baby. It would not matter what that means for her safety or the status of the fetus – nor that it violates her religious beliefs.
Strict abortion laws impinge on the religious freedom of observant Jews.
The laws that multiple states are now passing, or attempting to pass, make clear that a physician who participates in an abortion will be vigorously prosecuted. In Georgia, it also criminalizes traveling outside of the state to have an abortion.
Abortions, especially later in pregnancy when many of the dangers that necessitate one become apparent, require expertise and practice to perform safely. It is no exaggeration to say that this law will make even legal abortions for clear maternal physical danger much more difficult to access in these states, as research shows that laws passed to limit abortion correlate with decreases in the number of facilities providing them.
Also, what physician wants to learn how to do a procedure that could land them in prison for decades if a court finds retroactively that the mother was not in enough danger to necessitate it? Or that the danger was not imminent enough?
A reasonable Jewish observer might worry that the loosening of laws that regulate abortion would lead to an increase in abortions for halachically unjustifiable scenarios. A woman who decides that she would rather be pregnant during fall instead of summer, or after a given life event or financial achievement, would not find rabbinic support for such an abortion. Perhaps, the observer wonders, it is better to have strict laws to prevent such abortions.
But as I have expanded upon above, it is nearly impossible to create a law that limits abortion and does not put a secular legal ban on some halachically permissible abortions.
What Jewish community would want to continue to live in a place where they are potentially barred from following halacha? Is a community even allowed by halacha to continue living in such a place, if they have the option of leaving?
It appears to me that the Jewish community cannot justify staying on the sidelines of this national American issue. We need to take the side of allowing for safe, legal, available abortions. Jewish law does not align with the Christian right on this issue, and neither should Orthodox Jews.
Ephraim Sherman, DNP, RN, AGPCNP-BC, is a nurse practitioner and healthcare researcher, focused on the intersection of culture and healthcare.
Conflicts between Civil Law and Halakhah - The Observant Life: The Wisdom of Conservative Judaism for Contemporary Jews
What happens when civil law and halakhah are in conflict? What ought one do when one finds oneself in opposition to a policy of the ruling authorities, on religious grounds? Are there times when the priorities of religious tradition are more important than the concept of dina d’malkhuta dina? Should one be able to voice one’s personal objection to a civil law on a religious basis, or must one join with others as part of a unified communal stance? There is a long history of Jews standing up to ruling powers. From Moses to Jeremiah to Isaiah to the Maccabees, Jews have stood up to ruling authorities—whether those authorities have been of their own people or of other nations. Time and time again, the prophets demanded that ruling authorities abide by the highest standards of justice, ethics, and morality and not simply ignore laws they found personally inconvenient. In addition, civil disobedience in the pursuit of a higher moral, ethical, and just law has always been considered wholly appropriate behavior. Indeed, civil disobedience has a long and honorable tradition in the halakhah. And while Jewish law believes that value of human life is all-important, it dictates that people must choose to defy the authorities, even at the cost of their own lives, rather than obey a law or decree that would otherwise require them to commit murder, to engage in immoral sexual relations, or to worship idols (BT Sanhedrin 74a). The principle is simply that one remains responsible for one’s actions at all times. Jewish law does not sanction the excuse that one was simply following orders to justify the performance of immoral or illegal acts. (This concept is discussed as well by Rabbi Michael Graetz in his chapter on the halakhah of military service.) Following these religious dictates, some American Jews were supportive of civil disobedience in defense of civil rights during the 1960s, while others felt justified in participating in similar protests during the Vietnam War. Others, however, felt that there are ways to protest governmental policies without breaking any current laws. These are very complex issues with no simple answers. But Jewish law is clear that morality and justice are the standards by which civil law and human actions are measured. Sometimes it is with respect to the nuances of those definitions that the most interesting and passionate debates take place. In areas where Jewish law and civil legislation collide, there are also no simple answers. When religious dictates require that an individual follow personal religious laws that oppose civil statutes, decisions can become quite complex. For example, civil laws concerning abortion in some jurisdictions may not be in total consonance with normative Jewish law. Inheritance laws as promulgated by civil authorities may conflict with the laws of the Torah. Military dress codes may require an uncovered head during military service. It would be easy to cite many other issues with the potential to create conflict between the law of the land and Jewish religious dictates. How does one decide which legal system to follow? In some cases, dina d’malkhuta dina applies, and in such cases we must follow the law of the civil courts. In other cases, mostly in the realm of personal religious conviction, Jewish law is supreme and we are required to follow it even if it means coming into conflict with civil regulations. Obviously, it is essential when navigating these waters to have a clear understanding of what is actually required by Jewish law and what is mere custom. Judaism considers the welfare of the community to be an important value for each individual. Thus, being a citizen of a country entails obligations, responsibilities, and adherence to the rule of law. When these laws are in opposition to halakhah, rabbinic authorities must decide which law to follow. It is important to realize that instances of civil law being in total conflict with the laws of the Torah are extremely rare and that, therefore, Jews in the Diaspora are generally required to obey the law of the land. Whether in Israel or in the Diaspora, the halakhah dictates that Jews be loyal citizens of the country in which they live. Good citizenship is seen as an important value in Jewish life, and working to enhance the welfare of society is deemed not only an appropriate exercise, but a religious requirement as well. The very fact that almost all congregations include a prayer for the welfare of the worshipers’ country in their Sabbath prayers should be seen as a liturgical extension of this same principle. These and other issues relating to citizenship are discussed elsewhere in this volume in greater detail by Rabbi Jane Kanarek in her chapter on that specific topic. In the Talmud, at BT Z’vaḥim 102a, Rabbi Yannai is quoted as saying: “Let the awe of kingship always be upon you.” He used Moses’s behavior in Pharaoh’s court as his example, but his advice is clearly applicable to all forms of government, not just ruling royalty. Even though he disagreed with Pharaoh, Moses had to be respectful of Pharaoh’s position. And, Rabbi Yannai teaches, so must we all! In that same passage, however, we learn that Rabbi Yoḥanan inferred the same principle from the story of the prophet Elijah and the wicked King Ahab, as told in 1 Kings 18, in which Elijah is depicted as showing Ahab the respect due a king in spite of the strong opposition he always displayed toward Ahab’s reprehensible behavior. Thus, Jewish tradition understands that respect for governmental authorities is always appropriate, and that this is the case even when one disagrees strongly with some specific policy. At the same time, the system presumes that these authorities are sufficiently imbued with respect for justice and morality for the Jewish community to feel comfortable following their lead. If not, then opposition may and must be voiced. In most Western countries in which Jews currently live, differences of opinion are more about nuance and detail than about major legal principles. But debate is healthy and there will always be controversy concerning issues that relate to citizenship and morality. These debates are healthy for all societies, however, and should not be shunned or downplayed. The strength of any society rests in no small part on its willingness to engage in passionate debate about the principles that guide it forward and the rules it establishes as the norms of accepted or desired behavior. To squelch debate, therefore, is to deprive society of one of its most potent sources of creative energy and to open the way to despotism.
Jewish Takes On Abortion
Lost In Translation – the source of the controversy | |
שמות כא: כב – כה כב) וְכִי יִנָּצוּ אֲנָשִׁים וְנָגְפוּ אִשָּׁה הָרָה וְיָצְאוּ יְלָדֶיהָ וְלֹא יִהְיֶה אָסוֹן עָנוֹשׁ יֵעָנֵשׁ כַּאֲשֶׁר יָשִׁית עָלָיו בַּעַל הָאִשָּׁה וְנָתַן בִּפְלִלִים: (כג) וְאִם אָסוֹן יִהְיֶה וְנָתַתָּה נֶפֶשׁ תַּחַת נָפֶשׁ: (כד) עַיִן תַּחַת עַיִן שֵׁן תַּחַת שֵׁן יָד תַּחַת יָד רֶגֶל תַּחַת רָגֶל: (כה) כְּוִיָּה תַּחַת כְּוִיָּה פֶּצַע תַּחַת פָּצַע חַבּוּרָה תַּחַת חַבּוּרָה: | |
Exodus 21:22 - 23 Christian Bible based on the Septuagint (Greek translation in 250 BCE) 22. When men fight and one of them pushes a pregnant woman and she miscarries an imperfectly formed child, the one responsible shall be fined according as the woman’s husband may exact from him, the payment as the judges determine. 23. But if it is perfectly formed, the penalty shall be life for life… | Exodus 21:22-25 NJPS Translation 22When men fight, and one of them pushes a pregnant woman and a miscarriage results, but no other damage ensues, the one responsible shall be fined according as the woman’s husband may exact from him, the payment to be based on reckoning. 23But if other damage ensues, the penalty shall be life for life, 24eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, 25burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for bruise. |
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However, an alleged biblical source for a prohibition of abortion has been derived from this same passage, on the basis of an enigmatic and an almost certainly erroneous translation of the Hebrew text in the Septuagint. This ancient Greek version renders the Hebrew word ason (harm, injury) inexplicably as "form, shape," a meaning for which scholars are unable to offer a warrant or even a credible explanation. The passage then emerges as "But if it (the embryo) be perfectly formed, you shall give a life for a life." This dubious rendering has been used in the Christian Church as a biblical support for treating abortion as murder. -From “Abortion Major Wrong or Basic Right?” by Rabbi Robert Gordis, Proceedings of the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards I 1980 - 1985 | |
When does life begin? The Jewish and Christian View | |
Genesis Rabbah 34:10 ..From when is the soul endowed in human beings, from the time he leaves his mother’s womb or from before that time? Rabbi Yehudah the Patriarch said, “From the time he leaves his mother’s womb…” | בראשית רבא לד:י ועוד שאל אנטונינוס את רבינו א"ל מאימתי נשמה ניתנה באדם משיצא ממעי אמו או עד שלא יצא ממעי אמו, א"ל משיצא ממעי אמו, א"ל לאו, משל אם תניח בשר ג' ימים בלא מלח מיד הוא מסריח והודה לו ר' שהשוה דעתו לדעת המקרא שנאמר (איוב י) חיים וחסד עשית עמדי ופקדתך שמרה רוחי, מאימתי נתת בי את הנשמה משהפקדתני .רוחי |
Mishnah Niddah 3:7 One who has a miscarriage within 40 days need not worry that an embryo had formed [thus making her impure according to the laws of Lev 12:2-5. Naturally, a woman who gives birth becomes impure. the Mishnah rules that if she has a miscarriage before the 40th day, she is exempt from this impurity because there was no chance a fetus had formed. This implies that until the 40th day of pregnancy, the fetus does not even have the status of a fetus]. | משנה נדה ג:ז המפלת ליום ארבעים אינה חוששת לולד ליום ארבעים ואחד תשב לזכר ולנקבה ולנדה ר' ישמעאל אומר יום ארבעים ואחד תשב לזכר ולנדה יום שמונים ואחד תשב לזכר ולנקבה ולנדה שהזכר נגמר לארבעים ואחד והנקבה לשמונים ואחד וחכמים אומרים אחד בריית הזכר ואחד בריית הנקבה זה וזה לארבעים ואחד: |
Talmud, Yevamot 69b ...Until 40 days [after conception, the fetus] is mere water. | יבומות סט:ב אמר רב חסדא : טובלת ואוכלת עד ארבעים, דאי לא מיעברא - הא לא מיעברא, ואי מיעברא - עד ארבעים מיא בעלמא היא. |
Christian View Catholicism has been confronted by some special theological problems. For many centuries, Catholic theologians have debated the casuistic question of "ensoulment," i.e., just when the soul enters the fetus. The consensus among Catholic theologians, at least up to the present, has been that the soul enters the fetus at the moment of conception, so that the destruction of the embryo is tantamount to murder. Moreover, since Augustine, the Church has taught that an embryo must be baptized if it is not to suffer eternal damnation. These theological attitudes explain the passion with which the Catholic clergy and many of the laity react against abortion. In view of the heat with which the issue is argued today, it is of interest to note that Catholic teaching on the subject has fluctuated through time. In the fourth century, St. Basil condemned abortion at any stage, but the Code of Justinian in the sixth-century exempted from penalty abortions during the first forty days. This position was reaffirmed repeatedly by Papal decree for nearly ten centuries. In 1588, Pope Sistus V declared all abortions to be murder, but less than three years later, Gregory XIV rescinded his decree. Not until 1869 was the prohibition reinstituted by Pope Pius IX.1 It is this position that is now official Catholic doctrine. -From “Abortion Major Wrong or Basic Right?” by Rabbi Robert Gordis, Proceedings of the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards I 1980 - 1985 | |
Jewish View In Jewish sources random speculations as to when life begins are to be encountered, but they play no significant role in connection with abortion. In fact, Jewish law has a variety of time periods applicable to different issues as to when a newborn child is bar kayyama (independent and viable). To cite one familiar example, the pidyon haben (the redemption of the first-born) does not take place until the thirty-first day of the baby's life. What is fundamental is that halakhah explicitly recognizes that the fetus is not a viable being while it is in its mother's womb, since its life cannot be sustained outside its natural shelter there. -From “Abortion Major Wrong or Basic Right?” by Rabbi Robert Gordis, Proceedings of the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards I 1980 – 1985 | |
Life of the mother or the child? Complications at birth | |
Mishnah Ohalot 7:6 [A] If a woman is having difficulty in giving birth (so that her life is in danger), one cuts up the fetus insider her and takes it out limb by limb because her life takes precedence over its life. [B] Once a greater part (or, its head) has come out, it must not be touched, for we do not set aside one life for another. | משנה אהלות ז:ו האשה שהיא מקשה לילד מחתכין את הולד במעיה ומוציאין אותו אברים אברים מפני שחייה [A] קודמין לחייו יצא רובו אין נוגעין בו שאין דוחין נפש מפני נפש: [B] |
Talmud Bavli Sanhedrin 72a R. Huna said: A minor in pursuit may be slain to save the pursued. Thus he maintains that a pursuer, whether an adult or a minor, need not be formally warned. R. Hisda asked Rav Huna: we learnt: Once his head has come forth, he may not be harmed, because one life may not be taken to save another. But why so? Is he not a pursuer? — There it is different, for she is pursued by heaven. | סנהדרין אמר רב הונא: קטן הרודף ניתן להצילו בנפשו. קסבר: רודף אינו צריך התראה, לא שנא גדול ולא שנא קטן. איתיביה רב חסדא לרב הונא: יצא ראשו - אין נוגעין בו, לפי שאין דוחין נפש מפני נפש. ואמאי? רודף הוא! - שאני התם, דמשמיא קא רדפי לה. |
Rashi on Sanhedrin 72b As long as the fetus has not exited to the outside air it is not a person and one may kill it to save the mother. | Rashi, ad loc. יצא ראשו - באשה המקשה לילד ומסוכנת, וקתני רישא: החיה פושטת ידה וחותכתו ומוציאתו לאברים, דכל זמן שלא יצא לאויר העולם לאו נפש הוא וניתן להורגו ולהציל את אמו, אבל יצא ראשו - אין נוגעים בו להורגו, דהוה ליה כילוד ואין דוחין נפש מפני נפש |
Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Laws of Murder 1:9 It is a negative commandment not to spare the life of a pursuer. Therefore the Sages ruled that when a woman has difficulty giving birth, one dismembers the child in her womb -either by drugs or surgery – because he is like a pursuer seeking to kill her. Once his head has emerged, he many not be touched, for we do not set aside one life for another. This is the natural course of the world. | הרי זו מצות לא תעשה שלא לחוס על נפש הרודף. לפיכך הורו חכמים שהעוברה שהיא מקשה לילד מותר לחתוך העובר במיעיה בין בסם בין ביד מפני שהוא כרודף אחריה להורגה, ואם משהוציא ראשו אין נוגעין בו שאין דוחין נפש מפני נפש וזהו טבעו של עולם |
Maimonides, who summarizes this provision of the Mishnah in his code, adds an explanation which has had the practical effect of limiting the permissibility of abortion among some later authorities. He explains that the permission to destroy the embryo set forth in the Mishnah is due to the fact that the embryo is "like a pursuer seeking to kill the mother."6 This explanation would seem to permit abortion only when and if the mother's life is in danger. This interpretation of Maimonides, which Feldman rightly calls "a surprising position,"7 is clearly more restrictive than the talmudic provision. I would suggest that the reason that Maimonides and other medieval codifiers diverge from the Mishnah may inhere in the same conditions that led them to disregard the clear talmudic warrants for birth control. They were leaders of a community perpetually engaged in a desperate struggle for survival against disease, expulsion and massacre. They felt keenly the necessity for bringing many children into the world and thus preserving the Jewish people against extinction. Since group survival took precedence over individual well-being, they sought to limit such practices as abortion and birth control, or to forbid them altogether, in spite of the clear provisions in the Mishnah and the Talmud. Many later authorities attempted to explain away Maimonides' limitation and to harmonize it with the broader principle laid down in the Mishnah, a discussion that has continued to the present.8 While some would restrict the provision permitting abortion only to cases when the mother's life is in danger, the majority of decisions recognize that physical injury to the mother, even if death is not involved, should also be a legitimate ground for abortion. -From “Abortion Major Wrong or Basic Right?” by Rabbi Robert Gordis, Proceedings of the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards I 1980 - 1985 | |
Capital punishment for pregnant women, another view | |
Mishnah Arakhin 1:4 In the case of a woman [convicted of a capital crime] who goes forth to be executed [and who after he verdict was returned is found to be pregnant] we do not wait for her to give birth. If she already sat at the birthing chair, then we wait until she gives birth. | האשה שהיא יוצאה ליהרג אין ממתינין לה עד שתלד ישבה על המשבר ממתינין לה עד שתלד |
Under what circumstances? Abortion in the case of Tay Sachs | |
Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg (1915-2006), Tsits Eliezer 13:102 With regard to an abortion because of the Tay-Sachs disease…in this case in which the consequences are so grave if the pregnancy and childbirth are allowed to continue, it is permissible to terminate the pregnancy until seven months have elapsed, and in a way in which no danger will befall the mother. Beyond seven month the issue is more serious since at the end of the seven months the fetus if often fully developed… It is clear that capital punishment is not prescribed for abortion…but the opinion of most rabbis is that the prohibition is only of Rabbinic origin and therefore, Maharit, in his responsa, permitted abortion for a Jewish woman whenever the matter was necessary for her health even when her life was not at stake… Therefore ask yourself is there a need greater than the pain and suffering that the woman in our case which will be inflicted upon her if she gives birth so such a creation whose very being is one of pain and suffering and his death is certain within a few years…and added to that is the pain and suffering of the infant…this would seem to be the classic case in which abortion may be permitted, and it does not matter what type of pain and suffering is endured, physical or emotional, as emotional pain and suffering is to a large extent much greater than physical pain and suffering. | |
Rabbi Moshe Feinstein (1895-1986), Iggrot Moshe, Hoshen Mishpat, 2:49 In Maimonides it is even more explicit that killing a fetus is actual murder…I have written all this because of the great calamity in the world that many governments have allowed the killing of fetuses, among them political leaders of the State of Israel, and countless fetuses have already been killed. I was appalled by the responsa of a learned man in Israel…who permits the abortion of a Tay-Sachs fetus even beyond three months, it is clear and simple as I wrote, the law which is made clear by the early Rabbis and the arbiters of Jewish law, that abortion is prohibited as it is considered actual murder, whether the fetus is pure or illegitimate, regular fetuses or those which are suffering from Tay-Sachs, that is is strictly prohibited, and do not err and rely on the responsa of that learned man. | |
What are some other cases? | |
Rabbi Ben Zion Uziel (Orthodox), Sephardic Chief Rabbi of Israel (1939-1953) It is clear that abortion is not permitted without reason. But for a reason, even if it is a slim reason, such as to prevent the pregnant woman's disgrace, then we have precedent and authority to permit it. | |
Mental Illness and Anguish | |
Rabbi David Feldman (Conservative), Marital Relations, Birth Control, and Abortion in Jewish Law In broadening his interpretation of life-threatening situations, Rabbi Unterman (Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi of Israel, 1950's-60's) does include extreme mental anguish as well. Suicidal tendencies are a threat to her life and, as such, also constitute adequate warrant. ... Insanity alone is not a life-threatening situation, he writes, for the insane are protected by the same instinct for self-preservation as the rest of us. Insanity, however, that carries with it suicidal tendencies or attacks of hysteria does constitute a life-and-death matter, because a person so afflicted can do physical harm to self or others, and so on…If a possibility or probability exists that a child may be born defective and the mother would seek an abortion on grounds of pity for the child whose life will be less than normal, the Rabbi would decline permission. Since we don't know for sure that he will be born defective, and since we don't know how bad that defective life will be, and since no permission exists in Jewish law to kill born defectives, permission on those grounds would be denied. If, however, an abortion for that same potentially deformed child were sought on the grounds that the possibility is causing severe anguish to the mother, permission would be granted. | |
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